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FLASH BACK : DE TRUMP VS BIDEN À MADISON VS HAMILTON



Tant le fond que la forme du débat présidentiel américain de 2020 donnent une image assez décevante de l’état actuel du système constitutionnel et politique des États-Unis.

Il est donc peut-être opportun de reprendre à cette occasion quelques extraits du dialogue historique de deux pères fondateurs (James Madison et Alexander Hamilton) à l’occasion de la ratification de la Constitution en 1787. 


Ces citations sont extraites - à titre exemplatif - des fameux Federalist Papersqui ont longtemps inspiré l’évolution de la pensée politique et des bases constitutionnelles américaines.


Elles montrent comment ces deux protagonistes - qui furent aussi parmi les fondateurs des deux grands partis politiques du pays - ont su mener un débat de haute qualité (tant dans le style que dans le fond) et échanger de façon constructive leurs conceptions respectives de la future démocratie républicaine d’outre atlantique. 


"O tempora, O mores” : Madison et Jefferson nous invitent ainsi à ne pas désespérer de cette démocratie ni de ce grand pays qui a traversé - comme d’autres - bien des vicissitudes.


MADISON


"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary."

"This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other (and) that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit"


"The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government."

HAMILTON


"It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place."

"The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue

Jean-Guy Giraud  04 / 10 / 20

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Voir aussi : https://www.lesamisdutraitedelisbonne.com/post/d-alexander-hamilton-de-james-madison-et-de-la-nouvelle-generation-européenne

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